Native People and the Environmental Regime in the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement by Peters, Evelyn J.
ARCTIC
VOL. 52, NO. 4 (DECEMBER 1999) P. 395– 410
Native People and the Environmental Regime
in the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement
EVELYN J. PETERS1
(Received 13 October 1998; accepted in revised form 1 June 1999)
ABSTRACT. A major objective of the Cree and Inuit in signing the 1975 James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement was to
protect the environment and thus secure their way of life based on harvesting activities. The main elements of the federal,
provincial, and Agreement environmental protection regimes are compared with respect to principles derived from the growing
literature on indigenous peoples and environmental assessment. The Agreement contained pioneering provisions for environmental
assessment; yet those provisions have not met many of the expectations of the Native people. Part of the dissatisfaction derives
from the Agreement itself: some sections are vague and difficult to translate into practices; the advisory committee structures are
not well suited to Native cultures; and the right to develop is woven throughout the sections on environmental protection. However,
failures and delays in implementing the Agreement have also contributed to this dissatisfaction. These issues have implications
for the negotiation strategies of other groups.
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RÉSUMÉ. Un objectif majeur des Cris et des Inuit en signant la Convention de la Baie James et du Nord québécois était de protéger
l’environnement et de conserver ainsi leur mode de vie fondé sur les activités d’exploitation des ressources fauniques. On compare
les principaux éléments contenus dans les régimes de protection environnementale fédéral, provincial et de la Convention avec
les principes tirés de la documentation de plus en plus abondante sur les peuples autochtones et l’évaluation environnementale.
La Convention contenait des clauses innovatrices concernant l’évaluation environnementale, mais ces clauses n’ont pas permis
de répondre aux attentes des Autochtones. Cette insatisfaction tient en partie à la Convention même: certains articles sont vagues
et difficiles à appliquer concrètement; les structures des comités consultatifs ne conviennent pas bien aux cultures autochtones;
et le droit à la mise en valeur se faufile dans tous les articles traitant de la protection environnementale. Cependant, des échecs
et des retards dans la mise en oeuvre de la Convention ont également contribué à cette insatisfaction. Ces questions ont des
implications pour les stratégies de négociation d’autres groupes.
Mots clés: évaluation environnementale, Convention de la Baie James et du Nord québécois, accords sur les revendications
territoriales, économies de subsistance
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INTRODUCTION
Despite assumptions about their inevitable passing, indig-
enous hunting, fishing and trapping economies have survived
in many areas of the North American continent. The flexibil-
ity of indigenous economies has enabled them to avoid or
accommodate frontier activity and intrusion by withdrawing
to more and more marginal lands (Brody, 1983; Kayahna
Area Tribal Council, 1985). However, there are limits beyond
which hunting economies and frontier development become
irreconcilable. Introducing a collection of articles on the
geography of indigenous struggles, Stea and Wisner (1984:5)
described the most recent phase in a history of encroachment
on indigenous peoples’ land:
Having spent the better part of one hundred years pacifying
their indigenous peoples and allocating to them what was
then perceived as the very worst land...the major industrial
powers are suddenly finding that these areas...cover
enormous energy and mineral resources. Thus the dominant
industrialists buttress these nation-states’ own attempts
[to incorporate marginal lands] with notions of “energy
crisis” and “strategic minerals.” Oil, coal, and uranium
are the chief foci, although in some places surface and
even underground water has begun to be re-evaluated by
capital as potentially strategic.
This phase may result in the destruction of those indig-
enous hunting economies that have survived.
Maintaining a subsistence economy is seen as a decisive
factor in indigenous peoples’ struggles for cultural sur-
vival (Berger, 1985; Jull, 1988; Simon, 1992; Brascoupé,
1993; Nuttall, 1994). Indigenous peoples internationally
have used a variety of strategies to combat the threat that
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uncontrolled economic development poses for their econo-
mies and ways of life (Stea and Wisner, 1984; Burger,
1987). In Canada, the possibility of enhancing their ability
to maintain a subsistence economy has been a major
impetus for indigenous peoples’ attempts to assert sover-
eignty over their lands and their lives through land-claim
negotiations and self-government arrangements (Peters,
1989). While some arrangements have existed for more
than two decades, there is almost no work that evaluates
their appropriateness in protecting environments for the
subsistence use of indigenous peoples (Young, 1995 is an
exception).
In Canada, the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agree-
ment (hereafter, the Agreement) was signed in 1975.
While the Agreement was the product of an out-of-court
settlement rather than a land-claim settlement, it became
an important precedent in subsequent land-claim negotia-
tions. A major Cree and Inuit objective in negotiating the
Agreement was to secure their way of life based on har-
vesting activities (Feit, 1980, 1988; Brooke, 1995). The
process of implementing the Agreement has helped to
define its status in Canadian law. This experience may be
of interest to other indigenous groups attempting to design
mechanisms for protecting their lands and economies.
After a brief background to the negotiation of the
Agreement and to Cree and Inuit objectives with respect to
environmental protection, this paper outlines the main
elements of the environmental protection regimes for Cree
and Inuit lands under the Agreement. The Cree protest
against the Great Whale hydroelectric project is described
to illustrate some issues involved in implementing provi-
sions of the Agreement. While the Inuit did not oppose the
project in the same way, the Cree experience provides an
important context for the analysis. The final section evalu-
ates the environmental protection regime in the Agree-
ment and the appropriateness of Agreement, federal, and
provincial regimes for protecting indigenous economies,
using principles derived from the growing literature on
environmental assessment and indigenous peoples. The
paper relies mainly on materials produced by the Cree and
Inuit and individuals working for their organizations: as
the question here is whether provisions in the Agreement
meet the needs of the indigenous residents, their views
count the most.
NEGOTIATING THE AGREEMENT
In 1971, the Quebec government began to construct the
James Bay Hydroelectric Project in an area not yet ceded
by the Native peoples, and which was still used by them in
their traditional hunting pursuits (Richardson, 1975;
LaRusic, 1979; Salisbury, 1986). The land in question had
been transferred by the federal government to Quebec
under the 1912 Boundary Extension Act, with the condi-
tion that the province obtain surrender of Native interests
in the area prior to development. When the province failed
to negotiate, the Cree and Inuit instituted legal proceed-
ings against Quebec and the James Bay Development
Corporation in May 1972.
Mr. Justice Malouf of the Quebec Superior Court granted
the Cree and Inuit a hearing and, after receiving the
testimony of Inuit and Cree hunters about their continuing
use and occupation of these lands, accorded an interlocu-
tory injunction against the hydroelectric development in
process. The Malouf decision was suspended a week later
pending a final decision by the Quebec Court of Appeal on
a permanent injunction. Quebec’s fear that in the end the
Cree might be awarded substantial damages and the inabil-
ity of the Cree and Inuit to stop construction during court
proceedings provided the impetus for both sides to nego-
tiate an out-of-court settlement. An agreement-in-princi-
ple was reached on 15 November 1974. On 21 November
1974, the Quebec Court of Appeal denied the Cree and Inuit
a permanent injunction, putting an end to litigation on that
issue. A final agreement was completed in November 1975.
Quebec’s intention in negotiating the Agreement was to
affirm its presence and jurisdiction over the territory and to
open the area for economic development (Ciaccia, 1976:xi–
xxiv). Hydroelectric development of Quebec’s northern riv-
ers was a long-standing objective of Robert Bourassa,
Quebec’s Premier during many of the events described here
(Bourassa, 1985). In an attempt to prevent aboriginal people
from blocking regional development, Quebec insisted that
the province retain final control over authorization of eco-
nomic development in the territory referred to in the Agree-
ment, except on lands reserved for aboriginal communities.
Unable, in the face of Quebec’s objectives, to gain
jurisdiction over the whole territory, Cree and Inuit nego-
tiators followed a number of strategies to protect the land
for subsistence activities. They negotiated a detailed hunt-
ing regime that allowed them continuing access to wildlife
resources on most of the lands of the territory referred to
in the Agreement (Section 24), and they obtained
financial support programs for Cree and Inuit harvesters
(Sections 29 and 30). The focus of this paper, however, is
on Sections 22 and 23 in the Agreement, which attempt to
protect the environment for harvesting activities.
When the Agreement was negotiated, there were few
precedents or models for environmental protection. Where
they existed at all, federal and provincial environmental and
social protection regimes were weak, with no explicit social
component, limited provisions for public involvement, and
no general obligation to conduct impact assessments and
reviews. Yergeau (1988:296) reviewed the environmental
regime in the Agreement a decade after it was signed:
The Agreement is a pioneering document in the field of
environmental protection, in particular with respect to the
criteria governing environmental and social impact
statements....[T]hat it stated all this in 1975 was evidence
of an unheard-of boldness far in advance of any other
legislation in the world dealing with the environmental
impacts of development.
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In 1980, Feit (1980:12) demonstrated a cautious opti-
mism about the effectiveness of the environmental regime
outlined in the Agreement.
The combination of these distinctive principles, obligatory
consultations, special representations and mechanisms
for inputs into consultations, was thought to sufficiently
constrain the exercise of governmental authority that it
would have to respect and, in part, serve Cree interests and
concerns. The compromises involved in accepting this
more limited control over development activities and
social and environmental protection were hard ones for
the Cree, and it is still too soon to tell whether or not these
provisions will be adequate.
Within a decade, Feit’s evaluation had changed.
The threat to the hunting economy posed by relatively
unregulated industrial development of the region pinpoints
the...failure of the agreement process to effectively resolve
conflicts over resource control and economic development.
Large-scale industrial development projects are continuing
on Cree lands.... [T]he failure to adequately regulate
development is a major future threat to the revitalized
hunting sector. These threats demonstrate...that the
agreement process was unable to resolve fundamental
conflicts between the interests of Cree and those of wider
economic and political institutions of the capitalist
economy or the liberal democratic state. (1989:96 –97)
Nevertheless, the sections of the Agreement referring to
environmental protection played a major role in the Cree
protest against the Great Whale River hydroelectric project,
which was put on hold in 1994. Moreover, the federal and
provincial governments and the Cree and Inuit have been
negotiating implementation issues for more than two dec-
ades (Peters, 1989; Brooke, 1995; Penn, 1995). Thus it is
difficult to know whether the problem lies with specific
provisions of the Agreement, or with the ways in which
those provisions have (or have not) been put into effect.
The following paragraphs attempt to evaluate these issues.
MAIN COMPONENTS OF THE SOCIAL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION REGIME
Land Regime
The Agreement distinguishes three main classes of land
(Categories I – III) with respect to allocation of title, re-
sources, interest, and jurisdiction. Provincial insistence on
opening up the area for economic development limited the
size of the land base over which the Cree and Inuit could
negotiate ownership or control.
Category I lands correspond to the locations of Cree and
Inuit villages and their peripheries (Figs. 1 and 2). Cat-
egory IA lands are areas transferred by Quebec to Canada
for the exclusive use and benefit of the Cree bands. Cat-
egory IB lands are areas whose ownership has been trans-
ferred by Quebec to Cree landholding corporations. In the
case of the Inuit, Category I lands are areas whose owner-
ship Quebec has transferred to Inuit Village Corporations.
Category I lands are sufficient in size for community sites
with some buffer between the community and adjacent
development. However, such areas provide only very
limited protection for the hunting economy. Moreover,
Category I lands are subject to fairly extensive expropria-
tion powers of the federal and provincial governments.
Category II lands adjoin Category I lands. They are
lands under provincial jurisdiction on which the Cree and
Inuit have exclusive rights of harvesting and outfitting.
Category II lands may also be expropriated by Canada or
Quebec for development.
Category III lands cover the balance of the territory
referred to in the Agreement. Native people have exclusive
rights to trap and create commercial fisheries for some
species on Category III lands. These lands are areas of
joint use by Native and non-Native peoples, but Native
people are to be subject to a minimum of control or
regulation with respect to hunting and fishing, and any
controls imposed on them must be decided by a Hunting,
Fishing, and Trapping Coordinating Committee on which
Native people are represented. (The harvesting regime for
the Agreement is found in Section 24 of the Agreement. A
full description of this regime is beyond the scope of this
paper, but see Brooke, 1995.) While the Cree and Inuit
have little power to restrict non-renewable resource or
economic development on Category II and III lands, and
while the Agreement explicitly gives Quebec the right to
economic development on these lands, Quebec’s rights
are subject to the environmental regimes set out in the
Agreement.
Environmental Protection Regimes
Sections 22 and 23 of the Agreement set out the proc-
esses and criteria to be employed in assessing the social
and environmental effects of developments south and
north of the 55th parallel, respectively. The Great Whale
River hydroelectric development, described in the follow-
ing section, would have been located in both areas.
The James Bay Advisory Committee on the Environ-
ment (JBACE) and the Kativik Environmental Advisory
Committee (KEAC) were created to facilitate Cree and
Inuit input into all aspects of decision making about the
management of development in the area referred to in the
Agreement (Table 1). These committees were established
as consultative bodies to responsible governments on
issues concerning the environmental regime and the for-
mulation of laws relating to the environment. Their re-
sponsibility is to review existing and proposed
development-related legislation and regulations (includ-
ing environmental impact assessments) that affect Cree
and Inuit environments and recommend environmental
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FIG. 1. Inuit land selection, 1975.
laws, regulations, and other measures to responsible gov-
ernments. Federal and provincial governments are re-
quired to fund a secretariat for the committees, and the
committees can call on expert advice if necessary.
The bodies formed to deal specifically with impact
assessment processes are also described in Table 1. Fed-
eral and provincial governments fund staffing require-
ments for these bodies and pay for experts required in their
deliberations. When a new development is proposed, the
review bodies make recommendations to the appropriate
Administrator about the need for an environmental impact
statement and and its nature and extent. The Administrator
makes the decision and, if appropriate, issues guidelines
for the assessment to the proponent. There is no provision
for public consultation at this stage. The review bodies
evaluate the environmental impact statement submitted by
the proponent and, except for the Kativik Environmental
Quality Commission (KEQC), recommend to the Admin-
istrator under what conditions a development may pro-
ceed. The KEQC can decide whether or not a development
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FIG. 2. Cree land selection, 1975.
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may proceed, and the Quebec Administrator must obtain
the approval of the Lieutenant Governor in Council if he or
she does not wish to follow the decision of the KEQC.
During the evaluation and review stage, the review bodies
may hold public consultations or invite written comments
concerning the environmental impact statement.
The Agreement indicates that a Cree or Kativik local
government “Administrator” is responsible for decisions
about matters affecting the environment on Category I
lands. The federal regime on Category II and III lands
operates under the authority of a person or persons ap-
pointed by the Governor in Council, also known as the
“Administrator.” At the time of the events addressed in
this paper, the Chair of the Federal Environmental Assess-
ment Review Office was the “Federal Administrator.”
The provincial regimes are under the authority of an
“Administrator” appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in
Council. The Quebec Minister of the Environment was the
“Provincial Administrator” for matters under provincial
jurisdiction during the events related to the Great Whale
project.
The scope of environmental impact assessments is also
addressed in paragraphs 22.2.4 and 23.2.4. According to
these sections, responsible governments must give “due
consideration” to a series of principles that include:
• protecting the “hunting, fishing and trapping rights of
the Native people”;
• “minimizing the impact on Native people by
developmental activity”;
• protecting Native people, societies, communities and
economies, and wildlife resources, physical, biotic
and ecological systems with respect to developmental
activity; and
• minimizing the “negative environmental and social
impacts of development on Native people and on
Native communities.”
The environmental regime, then, had several features
through which the negotiators attempted to enhance its
effectiveness in protecting hunting economies. The re-
gimes created permanent committees with Cree and Inuit
participation, mandated by the Agreement. The regimes
had a clear place in government decision-making proce-
dures and were obligatory rather than voluntary. Funding
and staffing were provided for in the Agreement (though
only in general terms). Expert information was to be made
available to these bodies. The assessment of the proposed
development was to consider the effect of development on
hunting economies, and a series of principles to protect
these economies attempted to limit the exercise of powers
by federal and provincial governments. In this way, the
Native peoples attempted to ensure that the values and
priorities of hunting economies would be taken into ac-
count in development activities and that these activities
would address the potentially negative effects on Native
communities and cultures.
However sub-paragraphs 22.2.2(f) and 23.2.2(f) also
indicate that the environmental regime provides for “the
right to develop” in the area referred to in the Agreement,
and paragraphs 22.2.4 and 23.2.4 include the right to
develop in the principles to which governments and agen-
cies “shall give due consideration.” Moreover, clauses and
arrangements in the Agreement do not tell the whole story.
The meaning of particular phrases may be contested,
implementation may be slow or partial, federal and provin-
cial governments may choose not to implement particular
elements, and Native peoples may not have the resources
to fully participate in the bureaucracy that the Agreement
created. Evaluating the effectiveness of particular arrange-
ments also requires an examination of instances where
particular provisions were put into practice. Reed’s (1990)
study of the environmental impact assessment process
negotiated under the Inuvialuit Agreement showed that
practice frequently diverged from the procedures outlined
in the Agreement. The following section provides some
insights into how parts of the environmental regimes in the
James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement were imple-
mented. The context is the proposed hydroelectric devel-
opment on the Great Whale River, in the territory referred
to in the Agreement.
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT
OF THE GREAT WHALE PROJECT
The Cree and Inuit depend on the land for their suste-
nance, and they consider it their own (Brooke, 1995; Penn,
1995). In addition to hydroelectric development, forestry,
contamination from mercury and airborne substances such
as PCBs, roads, and mining development represent major
threats to the Cree and Inuit subsistence base. These
threats are not distributed evenly. In the southern part of
Cree territory, for example, forestry is taking more land out
of the hunting economy than hydroelectric development.
Hydroelectric development has not affected Inuit lands as
much as it has Cree lands. This section focuses on hydro-
electric development because more published material is
available on the relationship between its environmental
impacts and the contents of the Agreement.
The Hydroelectric Projects
 A description of some aspects of the La Grande project
illustrates the scope of the undertaking. La Grande Phase
I was started in 1973 and completed in 1986. With eight
main dams, 198 dikes, and five major reservoirs, the
project diverted seven rivers, nearly doubling the flow of
the La Grande River in winter (Day and Quinn, 1992).
La Grande Phase I flooded in excess of 10 000 km2 of
land. Construction on La Grande Phase II began in 1991
and is now complete. This phase involved constructing
one reservoir, diverting one river, and flooding an area of
765 km2.
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TABLE 1. Environmental protection bodies under the Agreement.
Committee Membership Section
Reviewing and Formulating Laws and Regulations for Environmental Protection
South of the 55th Parallel
James Bay Advisory Committee on the Environment (JBACE) Four representatives appointed by each of the Cree Regional Authority (CRA), 22.3
Quebec, Canada, plus the Chair of the Hunting, Fishing and Trapping
Coordinating Committee
North of the 55th Parallel
Kativik Environmental Advisory Committee (KEAC) Three representatives appointed by each of the Kativik Regional Government 23.5
(KRG), Quebec, Canada
Setting Guidelines for Environmental and Social Impact Assessment
South of the 55th Parallel
Evaluating Committee (COMEV) Two representatives appointed by each of the Cree Regional Authority (CRA), 22.5
Quebec, Canada
North of the 55th Parallel
Kativik Environmental Quality Commission (KEQC) Four representatives appointed by the KRG, five by Quebec 23.3
Federal Review Committee North (FRC-North) Two representatives appointed by the KRG, three representatives by Canada 23.4
Evaluating and Reviewing Impact Assessments
South of the 55th Parallel
Provincial Review Committee (COMEX) Two representatives appointed by the CRA, three by Quebec 22.6
Federal Review Committee (FRC-South) Two representatives appointed by the CRA, three by Canada 22.6
North of the 55th Parallel
Kativik Environmental Quality Commission (KEQC) Four representatives appointed by the KRG, five by Quebec 23.3
Federal Review Committee North (FRC-North) Two representatives appointed by the KRG, three representatives by Canada 23.4
In 1989, Quebec announced plans to begin a second
hydroelectric development project on the Great Whale
River. The proposed Great Whale River project, often
called James Bay II, would have diverted water from four
major rivers into the Great Whale River. The project
entailed 4 reservoirs that together cover 4387 km2, 5 dams,
133 dikes, and 3 generating stations.
The Cree have argued that the ongoing and proposed
hydroelectric projects and their short- and long-term social
and environmental effects have had and will continue to have
serious negative effects on their hunting economies and their
society (Hodgins and Cannon, 1995). As a consequence,
they took the lead in an ongoing legal and public relations
battle to halt construction or, failing that, to ensure that
developers minimized the damage to Cree lands.
Environmental Impact Assessment of the Great Whale
River Hydroelectric Project
Quebec decided to reactivate work on the Great
Whale River hydroelectric project (the project had
been on the drawing board since 1975, but further work
was postponed in 1982) without consulting any of the
review bodies set up under the Agreement. Instead, the
province indicated that an environmental impact as-
sessment would be conducted under provincial guide-
lines. According to section 8.1.3, hydroelectric projects
in the area referred to by the Agreement are exempt
from social impact assessment and are “subject to the
environmental regime only in respect to ecological
impacts.” The exemption, however, does not bypass
other aspects of the environmental impact assessment
process defined in the Agreement.
Ottawa’s initial position was that because the project
might affect areas under federal jurisdiction, an assess-
ment was required under the Federal Environmental As-
sessment Review Process (EARP) and, in addition, that a
federal review was required pursuant to sections 22 and 23
of the Agreement. Quebec argued that no federal review
was required because the project was under provincial
jurisdiction (Posluns, 1993).
In October 1990, Quebec proposed to split the environ-
mental review of the Great Whale project into two stages.
In the first stage, a commission would study the impact of
access infrastructure, such as roads, airports, bridges, and
docks. Quebec contended that Ottawa should not be in-
volved in this phase because these were not matters under
federal jurisdiction. The second stage would examine the
impact of the dams, dikes, reservoirs, and powerhouses.
Neither of these reviews was to be conducted pursuant to
the Agreement. While the first phase of the provincial review
was held up in the courts by legal challenges, Quebec began
construction. A troubling implication of construction starts
and of the split review was that, once millions of dollars
worth of access infrastructure was in place, it would be
politically difficult for the public review panel to deny the
project, or even recommend substantial changes.
The following month, the federal government abruptly
reversed its earlier position, informing the Cree that Ot-
tawa had no mandate for a separate federal review of the
Great Whale project. (See Posluns (1993) for a good
overview of these events.) Instead, Ottawa and Quebec
agreed to a single joint review; the federal portion would be
submitted to the provincial review body. The federal review
would follow the federal EARP guidelines rather than those
of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement.
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While the Inuit entered into negotiations with Hydro-
Quebec concerning project impacts and mitigating meas-
ures, the Cree launched a motion in the Federal Court to try
to force the federal government to live up to its responsi-
bilities under the Agreement (Cree Regional Authority v.
Robinson, [1991] 2 C.N.L.R. 41). The challenge for Cree
lawyers was twofold. They had to demonstrate that the
James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement had the status
of a federal law, and they had to prove that sections 22 and
23 applied to the Great Whale project. Justice Rouleau of
the Federal Court, Trial Division ruled on the first question
on 13 March 1991. He indicated that the Agreement did
not have the status of a contract, as federal lawyers had
argued: Parliament had intended it to operate as a law of
Canada. He added:
I feel a profound sense of duty to respond favourably [to
the Cree application]. Any contrary determination would
once again provoke, within the native groups, a sense of
victimization by white society and its institutions. This
agreement was signed in good faith for the protection of
the Cree and Inuit peoples, not to deprive them of their
rights and territories without due consideration. (Cree
Regional Authority v. Robinson [1991] 2 C.N.L.R. 41 at 48)
On 28 March 1991, the Federal Court of Appeal upheld
this decision (Hydro-Quebec v. A.-G. Canada et al. [1991]
3 C.N.L.R. 41 at 82), and on 14 May 1991 the Supreme
Court of Canada refused the Attorney General of Quebec
and Hydro-Quebec’s motion for leave to appeal.
In July 1991, Jean Charest, the new federal Minister of
the Environment, announced that the federal government
was legally bound to a separate review of the Great Whale
Project because of its possible impact on areas under
federal jurisdiction, for example fisheries, migratory birds,
and navigation on harnessed rivers. He indicated, how-
ever, that the federal review would be under the federal
Environmental Assessment Review Process (EARP). The
federal government maintained that it could not prevent
Quebec from beginning to build $775 million worth of
access infrastructure, including roads, marine terminals,
and airports, during the estimated two years of hearings.
Moreover the federal government argued that in cases of
overlapping jurisdiction, it did not have the constitutional
authority to block the project (Day and Quinn, 1992).
In September 1991, Justice Rouleau of the Federal
Court, Trial Division ruled that the federal government
had a public, nondiscretionary duty to carry out an inde-
pendent federal review, pursuant to the terms of the Agree-
ment. Justice Rouleau spelled out the nature of federal
decision-making responsibilities:
Sections 22.5.15 and 23.4.9 of the JBNQ Agreement
impose a mandatory duty on the federal administrator to
decide whether or not an environmental and social impact
assessment and review is required, and to determine the
nature and extent of any such assessment and review.
Sections 22.6.15 and 23.4.23 assign to the federal
administrator the obligation to either advise the developer
respecting the alternative submitted or to decide, based on
environmental and social impact considerations, whether
or not a proposed development should proceed. (Cree
Regional Authority v. Robinson [1991] 4 C.N.L.R. 84 at 85)
Justice Rouleau also pointed out that the federal govern-
ment, if it did not already have a fiduciary responsibility
toward the Cree, incurred that responsibility when it extin-
guished their Native rights pursuant to the Agreement.
On 23 January 1992, with a view to carrying out a global
and coordinated assessment of the proposal, the federal
and Quebec governments, the Cree Regional Authority,
the Grand Council of the Crees (of Quebec), the Kativik
Regional Government, and the Makivik Corporation signed
a Memorandum of Understanding concerning the coordi-
nation of environmental assessment and review processes
stemming from sections 22 and 23 of the James Bay
Agreement with the federal EARP. The Great Whale
Public Review Support Office, created by virtue of the
Memorandum, had as its objective the harmonization and
coordination of the work of the review bodies (Evaluating
Committee et al., 1992).
Guidelines for the environmental impact assessment of
the proposed Great Whale Hydroelectric Project were
transmitted to Hydro-Quebec in September 1992. In Au-
gust 1993, Hydro-Quebec submitted a feasibility study
containing the environmental impact statement (EIS) as-
sociated with the Great Whale project.
In their evaluation of Hydro-Quebec’s submission, the
review bodies concluded that “As submitted by the Propo-
nent, the EIS is presently neither sufficiently complete nor
adequate for the decision-making process” (Provincial
Review Committee et al., 1994:3):
In its introduction, the Joint Report highlighted seven
major inadequacies, including:
• ambiguities related to study area boundaries and project
schedule;
• treatment of principal assessment criteria…;
• knowledge of human societies affected;
• approach to the study of the combined and integrated
effects of the proposed project;
• justification of the proposed project;
• appreciation of the uncertainty associated with the
proposed project’s impacts;
• selection of mitigation measures and the short- and
long-term management of the proposed project.
(Provincial Review Committee et al., 1994:4)
A general discussion of the major shortcomings of the
report was followed by more than 100 pages of detailed
instructions for revisions.
The Joint Report was completed on 16 November 1994.
The report was never officially released, but it was for-
warded to Hydro-Quebec. On 18 November 1994, Quebec
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announced that the Great Whale project would be put on
hold. Clearly this decision was not a response to the Joint
Report. The Grand Council of the Crees, with other activ-
ists, had mounted an intensive and highly successful pub-
lic relations campaign on the eastern seaboard of the
United States. Moreover, the low price of natural gas in the
United States at that time allowed for the low-cost produc-
tion of electricity in local generators. These developments
resulted in the cancellation of several contracts to pur-
chase Hydro-Quebec electricity (Posluns, 1993; Grand
Council, 1995:23). Because the Great Whale project was
cancelled, some of the implications of the environmental
regime in the Agreement were not fully worked out for this
project. Nevertheless, the case demonstrates some of the
issues that are important for an evaluation of the environ-
mental regime.
THE AGREEMENT AND FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT REGIMES
Table 2 compares three environmental regimes—the
federal EARP and its successor, the 1992 Canadian Envi-
ronmental Assessment Act; Quebec’s environmental as-
sessment regulations; and the environmental regime set
out in sections 22 and 23 of the Agreement—with respect
to processes in place for assessing impacts on and protect-
ing subsistence economies. The Agreement supersedes
provincial legislation with respect to environmental im-
pact assessments. However, provincial legislation is de-
scribed here for purposes of comparison. The assessment
criteria used to compare federal, provincial, and Agree-
ment provisions have emerged from a growing literature
on Native peoples and environmental assessment. These
criteria are discussed individually below.
Mandatory Review and Assessment
All three review processes are mandatory. At the begin-
ning of the attempt to implement the environmental
assessment process of the Agreement for the Great Whale
River project, the federal EARP was viewed as discretion-
ary. However, rulings from court cases concerning Rafferty-
Alameda Dam (Canadian Wildlife Federation Inc. v.
Canada, 1989) and the Oldman River Dam (Friends of the
Oldman River Society v. Canada 1992) indicated that the
federal government had the mandatory duty to perform an
environmental impact assessment of any project that in-
volved aspects of federal jurisdiction. In 1992, the Cana-
dian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA) was put in
place, in part to make these requirements clear. Quebec’s
Environment Quality Act (1972), amended in 1978, re-
quires an environmental assessment of all projects identi-
fied by the regulations of that Act. The environmental
regimes under the Agreement place a legal obligation upon
all development proponents to comply with its provisions.
The legal status of the regimes is based on the James Bay
and Northern Quebec Final Agreement, 1975, and vali-
dated by the federal James Bay and Northern Quebec
Native Claims Settlement Act, 1977 and Quebec’s Act
approving the Agreement concerning James Bay and North-
ern Quebec, 1976.
It is worth noting, though, that it took a court decision
to force the federal government to live up to its responsi-
bilities and to agree to an environmental assessment pur-
suant to the federal environmental regimes specified in the
Agreement.
Mandatory Assessment of Social Impacts
Provincial, federal, and Agreement regimes vary with
respect to the requirement for social impact assessment.
Social impacts are not a necessary part of the provincial
evaluation procedure. In the 1984 Order-in-Council, the
scope of the EARP was defined to include assessment of
socioeconomic impacts that resulted directly from changes
in the biophysical environment. The Guide published by
the Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office
(FEARO) in 1986 notes:
Although the initiating department will determine the
extent to which socio-economic impacts are to be taken
into account in initial assessment, as a minimum, the
potential social change associated with the biophysical
impacts of a proposal must be considered. (Canada, Federal
Environmental Assessment Review Office, 1986:26)
The 1992 Canadian Environmental Assessment Act
requires the examination of “environmental effects” that
include:
any effect of any such change on health and socio-
economic conditions, on physical and cultural heritage,
on the current use of lands and resources for traditional
purposes by aboriginal persons or on any structure, site or
thing that is of historical, archaeological, paleontological
or architectural significance. (s. 2[1])
Under the Agreement, while hydroelectric develop-
ment is exempt from social impact assessment, other
economic development is not. Sections 22 and 23 of the
Agreement are explicit with respect to the requirement for
a social impact assessment. The assessment is described as
an environmental and social impact assessment through-
out these sections, and Schedule 3 of each section, which
describes the contents of the impact statement, includes
the specification of social impacts. However, a require-
ment to evaluate social impacts does not guarantee that the
resultant decision making will take them into account. The
Cree experience has been that the Quebec Ministry of the
Environment took the position that it was empowered to
make decisions only in areas where it had statutory or
regulatory authority to do so. Decisions concerning social,
economic, or cultural issues could not be imposed on other
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TABLE 2. Environmental impact assessment under federal, Quebec and Agreement processes.
Federal EARP Quebec Legislation James Bay Agreement
Mandatory review and assessment Yes Yes Yes
Mandatory assessment of social impacts Yes No Yes
Mandatory consideration of measures to protect hunting economies No No Yes
Cree and Inuit jurisdiction over development decisions No No See note1
Incorporation of Cree and Inuit values in impact assessment No No No
Incorporation of Cree and Inuit values in decision-making processes
– participation on review bodies No No Yes
– culturally appropriate decision-making processes No No No
Incorporation of Cree and Inuit values in defining desirable futures No No Yes
1 Limited – Cat. I land; Advisory – Cat. II and Cat. III land
departments that did not participate in or have input into the
assessment procedure (Penn, 1995). Despite the clear re-
quirement for social impact assessment, then, its implemen-
tation has proved elusive.
Mandatory Consideration of Measures to Protect Hunting
Economies
The definition and measurement of social impacts is a
value-laden exercise, and standard approaches may not
provide techniques or concepts that are effective in pro-
tecting subsistence economies. Researchers have argued
that it is particularly difficult to construct appropriate
methodological frameworks and processes for aboriginal
peoples (Shapcott, 1989; Ross, 1990; Notzke, 1994).
The assessment of social impacts for northern aborigi-
nal communities requires a different paradigm than that
required for non-aboriginal communities (Elias and
Weinstein, 1992, Vol. 1:5f; Weinstein et al., 1992:8f). For
example, many of the activities that comprise subsistence
economies do not have an easily calculated market value;
as a result, benefits from the introduction of a wage
economy can easily be overvalued. More importantly, a
model that views the replacement of a hunting, fishing,
trapping, and gathering society with one based on wage-
labour and business as a simple substitute of one kind of
economy for another does not provide an adequate
conceptualization of the meaning of the land-based activi-
ties that make up subsistence economies. Notzke (1994:277)
argues that:
The past two decades have shown that the effects of
industrial resource developments on small, northern
aboriginal communities are fundamentally different
from those on non-aboriginal communities. Studies
conducted in various communities...show the enduring
importance of wildlife, fish and plant resources in the
livelihood of native people. The reason for this is that
renewable resources do not merely constitute the
economic base for aboriginal communities, but their
harvesting provides the major integrative social force
[emphasis in original].
The loss of harvesting opportunities represents more than
the loss of an income-generating activity for which a
substitute can be found through wage-labour or social
assistance.
Because there is no requirement in Quebec legislation
for a social impact assessment, an evaluation of impacts on
hunting economies is not required either. Social impact
assessment was part of the federal environmental assess-
ment review process, and it is part of the current Canadian
Environmental Assessment Act; however, its presence does
not guarantee the appropriate assessment of impacts on
subsistence economies, for the reasons outlined above.
The Canadian Environmental Assessment Research Coun-
cil’s research prospectus (1985) identifies the types of
social change usually investigated as part of a social
impact assessment as demographic, economic, resource-
related, and cultural. This provides a good summary of
other approaches (see also Barrow, 1997:234) and demon-
strates some of the limitations of current social impact
assessment practices for dealing with subsistence econo-
mies. Clearly, changes in hunting economies cut across all
of these categories, and there is little provision for an
analysis that recognizes their interrelatedness. Moreover,
economic changes are conceptualized primarily in terms
of income-generating activities, with the result that many
subsistence activities are marginalized.
The Agreement potentially provides more scope for
directing attention to the particular nature of subsistence
economies. As noted above, Sections 22 and 23 introduce
a series of guiding principles designed to protect Native
economies. In addition, paragraphs 22.2.2 and 23.2.2 de-
scribe the environmental protection regime as one that
provides for the “protection of the Cree/Inuit people, their
economies and the wildlife resources upon which they
depend.” Schedule 3 of both sections states that “the
impact assessment procedure should contribute to a fur-
ther understanding of the interactions between Native
people, the harvesting of wild life resources and the eco-
nomic development of the Territory” (Canada, Quebec,
1976: 332, 357). The list of social conditions that form part
of the impact assessment specifically includes “harvesting
patterns” and the use and importance of various species in
harvesting activities.
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However these principles and clauses do not provide
detailed methods for assessing the effects on hunting
economies. In a 1985 review of the Agreement, Penn
(1988:130) noted that:
[I]t has proved difficult to translate such general
principles into operational language. However simple
and straightforward the principles may sound, we are
still some way from understanding how to translate
them into the detailed and subject-specific language of
impact assessment or environmental policy. However,
the concept of the guiding principle is sufficiently
important in the Agreement that operational definitions
of these principles will have to be found.
Nevertheless, sections 22 and 23 of the Agreement do
insist that hunting economies be taken seriously in the
evaluation of impacts of development. In this way they
provide some scope for constructing an appropriate ap-
proach to subsistence economies in the assessment of
development in the territory referred to in the Agreement.
Cree and Inuit Jurisdiction over Development Decisions
Neither federal nor provincial impact assessment pro-
cedures provide Native peoples with jurisdiction over
industrial development. Under the federal EARP and the
CEAA, the Minister of the Environment or the initiating
Minister (the minister responsible for the agency propos-
ing to undertake or authorize the project) makes decisions
about whether or not the development should take place
and under what terms and conditions. Under provincial
legislation, authority for decision making about develop-
ment projects is given to the Lieutenant-Governor in Coun-
cil, or delegated to a committee of ministers.
The Agreement allows the Native people limited con-
trol over development in the territory referred to in the
Agreement by giving Cree and Inuit local government
administrators jurisdiction over development decisions on
Category I lands. These lands make up only a small
proportion (approximately 1%) of the lands in the area,
however, and this level of control can have little impact on
the protection of subsistence economies. Federal and pro-
vincial administrators are responsible for decisions about
development in the remainder of the area referred to in the
Agreement. While federal and provincial decision makers
must consider recommendations from the review bodies
established under the Agreement, these bodies (except for
the KECQ) are nevertheless advisory in nature.
The KECQ’s decision-making authority has been an
important element contributing to its perceived effective-
ness among northern EIA bodies (Jacobs and Kemp, 1987).
The power allocated to the KECQ by its legislative base
has meant that, although its evaluation process is applied
in conjunction with the provincial Ministry of the Environ-
ment, it retains a semiautonomous role. Mulvihill and
Keith (1989, 404 – 405) note that:
On one occasion, the commission suspended its approval
of a regionally significant project (the relocation of a
village) in which the Province was the proponent. Despite
heavy pressure from the Ministry of Housing and the
Ministry of the Environment, the KEQC was able to hold
firm and withhold its approval until all of its conditions
were met.
However, although most of these bodies lack jurisdic-
tion over decisions about whether or not development
should go forward, the requirement for social impact
assessment may increase somewhat their level of political
influence. Researchers have argued that the process of
social impact assessment can facilitate community em-
powerment despite the communities’ lack of formal juris-
diction over development decisions (Corbett, 1986). The
process can provide a bargaining tool, allowing communi-
ties to negotiate the terms of development and in this way
manage to some extent its social and economic impacts. It
can also help build local leadership and community deci-
sion-making capacity (see also Gagnon et al., 1993). At the
same time, it is important to remember the costs, both
social and economic, of these kinds of battles. These costs
have disproportionately been borne by the Native peoples.
Incorporation of Cree and Inuit Values in Defining Effects
of Development
From her study of the Haida’s participation in the Joint
Canada/British Columbia West Coast Offshore Explora-
tion Panel in 1984 and 1985, Shapcott (1989:68) high-
lighted the ethnocentric nature of environmental impact
assessments in Canada:
Neither the courts nor the British Columbia
Environmental Appeal Board can factor the social
values of another culture into their decision-making.
The values of the dominant culture are so imbedded in
the process of EI (including that administered by the
Environmental Assessment Review Process at the
federal level), that alternative values cannot even be
considered. As noted earlier, the underlying values—
both the culture and the process—must be changed to
making environmental impact assessment meaningful
to Native people.
In part, culturally specific values enter into the assess-
ment process through an identification of the aspects of the
environment that need to be considered in the evaluation
process. Beanlands and Duinker (1983:92) point out:
It is impossible for an impact assessment to address all
potential environmental effects of a project. Therefore
it is necessary that the environmental attributes
considered to be important in project decisions be
identified at the beginning of an assessment.
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Clearly, different cultures might vary widely in what are
referred to as Valued Ecosystem Components or VECs.
Neither provincial nor federal impact assessment proc-
esses address the issue of VECs. There is nothing in
sections 22 and 23 of the Agreement that requires that Cree
and Inuit evaluations of aspects of the environment be
employed in impact assessment. However the 1992 Guide-
lines set by the joint scoping and review committees asked
Hydro-Quebec to describe the environment not only in
light of existing written scientific knowledge, but also
according to the precepts, values, and knowledge of the
aboriginal people:
No description of the environment can ever be complete
and exhaustive. Thus, it is preferable to carry out a
systematic description focused primarily on valued
ecosystem components....[T]he description of the different
environments to be carried out by Hydro-Quebec shall
take into account the knowledge of, and attitudes toward,
the environment specific to the Cree and Inuit cultures.
(Great Whale Public Review Support Office 1992:2,
emphasis in the original)
In their joint evaluation of Hydro-Quebec’s impact
assessment of the project, the scoping and review commit-
tees found that the study’s incorporation of Cree and Inuit
values was inadequate (Provincial Review Committee et
al., 1994). The Committees noted that the assessment was
based on limited and outdated knowledge of the societies
and cultures of the Native peoples in the territory referred
to in the Agreement, and that information about the envi-
ronmental knowledge and values of local communities
was entirely absent. The Cree and Inuit have noted the
general paucity of data to measure and monitor the effects
of development projects (Brooke, 1995; Penn, 1995;
Wilkinson and Vincelli, 1995). At present, the lack of data
makes it difficult to demonstrate that subsistence harvests
or tenure systems are being adversely affected. Wilkinson
and Vincelli (1995) argue that Hydro-Quebec, as propo-
nent of the major hydroelectric projects in the area, has
principal responsibility for ensuring baseline data required
for environmental assessment are collected systemati-
cally, and that this responsibility has not been exercised
adequately.
Quebec’s cancellation of the Great Whale project means
that we do not know exactly how the requirement to
incorporate Cree and Inuit values concerning the ecosys-
tem would have been implemented in the final impact
assessment. The existence of these provisions in the scoping
guidelines for the Great Whale project does not ensure that
similar guidelines will be employed for subsequent impact
assessments of industrial development in the territory
referred to in the Agreement. However scoping is a diffi-
cult exercise. It is likely, therefore, that future scoping
committees will refer to these Guidelines, and they may
provide a standard against which future exercises will be
measured. As such, they can serve as an important precedent
for incorporating Cree and Inuit values into the assessment
process. Without information available about these com-
ponents, however, the requirement to include them in an
impact assessment may be a meaningless gesture.
Incorporation of Cree and Inuit Values in Decision-
making Processes
Cree and Inuit values can be incorporated in decision-
making processes through representation on various re-
view bodies and through provisions for public participation.
While Cree and Inuit representatives are not excluded
from review bodies in federal and provincial impact as-
sessment procedures, neither is their presence mandated.
Under the Agreement, Cree and Inuit representatives
must be represented in the bodies that set guidelines for
and evaluate impact assessments. Discovering the extent
to which this participation creates a meaningful conduit
for Cree and Inuit interests requires attention to more than
the text of the Agreement, however. The dependence of the
environmental regime on advisory committees with Na-
tive representation reflects the assumption of the Native
negotiators that the interests of a small and economically
marginal population could influence public policy through
the creation of an interface with government representa-
tives (Brooke, 1995; Penn, 1995). Experience with the
review committees suggests that the significance of Na-
tive participation has been undermined by a number of
factors during the tenure of the Agreement. These factors
include the appointment to these committees of low-level
civil servants, who have little authority for decision mak-
ing; the frequent turnover of government representatives,
which limits their ability to develop expertise on issues or
real familiarity with Cree or Inuit cultures; and the una-
vailability of an independent research staff or research
budget (Voinson, 1988; Brooke, 1995; Penn, 1995;
Wilkinson and Vincelli, 1995). Wilkinson and Vincelli’s
(1995) review of the operation of these review bodies
points out that Cree and Inuit representatives have been
absent from more meetings than government representa-
tives, and also that they have occasionally abstained from
voting. The interpretation of these patterns is not entirely
clear, and they may have much to do with issues of cultural
appropriateness.
There are many indications that the processes of com-
munication and decision making created by the Agreement
are less than appropriate for Cree and Inuit cultures. Penn
(1995) notes that Cree representatives to review bodies are
often empowered to express collective viewpoints with
respect to certain issues, but they are not empowered to
negotiate or bargain without going back to their constitu-
encies (see also Brooke, 1995). Wilkinson and Vincelli
(1995) note that Cree and Inuit cultures are based on the
oral transmission of knowledge and concerns and on deci-
sion making by consensus of locally or directly affected
persons. Yet the environmental impact assessment re-
gimes in the Agreement make fewer provisions for public
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participation than either existing federal or provincial
regimes, and no provision was made in the Agreement for
intervenor funding. Many of the reviews take place in
southern locations. In addition, reviews rely heavily on
written materials: the vast majority of these are in French
or English, and many employ highly technical language.
Brooke (1995) indicates that Inuit participants’ expecta-
tion that their intimate knowledge of the land and wildlife
would make a valuable contribution to the workings of the
review bodies was not borne out. There has been little
incorporation of traditional environmental knowledge in
the deliberations of the committees to date (Brooke, 1995;
Wilkinson and Vincelli, 1995). The result has been the
increasing representation of the Cree and Inuit by younger
people (who are not necessarily the most knowledgeable
about or dependent on the environment) and heavy de-
pendence on non-Native consultants. Wilkinson and
Vincelli (1995) conclude that, although the review proc-
esses were expected to work differently in the area referred
to in the Agreement because of attempts to incorporate
Cree and Inuit values and participation, in fact they have
not met those expectations.
Incorporation of Cree and Inuit Values in Defining
Desirable Futures
Beyond assessing VECs from Cree and Inuit perspec-
tives and ensuring Native participation in decision-mak-
ing processes, some more general issues must be considered.
These issues have to do with how economic development
itself is evaluated. Tester (1992) has noted that environ-
mental impact assessment processes in Canada have em-
phasized mitigative measures, and cases of developments
cancelled as a result of social or environmental assess-
ments have been very rare. Underlying these results are the
assumptions that industrial development is positive, and
that negative spin-offs are secondary results, which can be
addressed through compensation or measures designed to
minimize their impacts. Impact assessment processes pro-
vide virtually no consideration of broader values, for
example, questioning the equation of development and
progress or the inevitability of modernization, and consid-
ering alternative relationships between people and envi-
ronments. Indigenous peoples’ attempts to preserve
subsistence economies often reflect an assessment of the
desirability of industrial development very different from
that of the developers.
Neither federal nor provincial legislation provides scope
for evaluating existing practices or frameworks for man-
aging industrial development. However, the James Bay
Advisory Committee on the Environment (JBACE) and
the Kativik Environmental Advisory Committee (KEAC)
created under the Agreement have as part of their mandate
the responsibility to evaluate legislation, policies, and reg-
ulations in the context of the principles laid out in sections
22 and 23. Unlike environmental impact assessment proc-
esses, which can only respond to proposals to change the
status quo, these committees have the authority to evaluate
current practices, including environmental assessment re-
gimes, and to do so under their own initiative.
At the same time, these Committees are merely advi-
sory to governments. Despite their status as the “preferen-
tial and official forum” for environmental protection
measures in the territory referred to in the Agreement, they
have not been given a clear role in government decision-
making structures, which infrequently consult with them
(Wilkinson and Vincelli, 1995). Moreover the ability of
the Committees to undertake analysis of existing practices
depends to a large extent on the degree to which these
bodies are supported and consulted by federal and provin-
cial governments. The Cree and Inuit have noted the
general paucity of data available for measuring and moni-
toring the effects of development projects (Brooke, 1995;
Penn, 1995; Wilkinson and Vincelli, 1995). The Cree have
argued that federal and provincial governments have lacked
a commitment to fully implement these Committees. As a
result, they have not operated continuously or effectively;
technical and scientific information, advice, and assist-
ance have not been forthcoming; and an adequate secre-
tariat has not been provided (Grand Council, 1987, 1991;
Mainville, 1991; Penn, 1995; Wilkinson and Vincelli, 1995).
Apart from issues of implementation, there are also
issues having to do with the relationship between rights to
develop and rights to protect subsistence economies in the
Agreement. The right to develop is one of the principles
governing the operation of the environmental regime. All
of the principles address the effects on Native economies
of development. In other words, there seems to be an
assumption that development is inevitable and desirable,
and that the purpose of the principles enunciated in the
Agreement is to minimize the negative effects of this
development on Cree and Inuit hunting economies, rather
than to halt development altogether.
At the same time, it is clear that the Agreement contem-
plates the possibility that the various review bodies may
recommend that no development take place, and these
recommendations could be made on the basis of negative
effects on hunting economies. It is also clear that the
Agreement gives the Cree and Inuit a number of rights,
which include the protection of hunting economies and
societies and the “guarantee of levels of harvesting equal
to present levels of harvesting of all species in the Terri-
tory” (paragraph 24.6.2). It is not easy to ascertain which
of these rights should take precedence in any particular
situation. For example, paragraph 5.5.1 states that:
the rights and guarantees given to the Native people by
and in accordance with the Section on Hunting, Fishing
and Trapping shall be subject to the rights to develop
Category III and Category II lands on the part of
Quebec....However, the developers shall be submitted
to the Environmental Regime which takes into account
the Hunting, Fishing and Trapping Regime.  (Canada,
Quebec, 1976:70)
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The Agreement, then, appears to present mixed opportuni-
ties for affecting the direction of development in the territory
referred to in the Agreement. While it seems to assume that
industrial development will occur, with attempts to mitigate
its effects, it also provides some avenues for the consideration
of alternative futures. At some degree and scale of industrial
development, it is clearly not possible to reconcile the protec-
tion of Cree and Inuit subsistence economies and the right to
develop written into the agreement. To date, it seems that
development initiatives have won out, particularly on Cree
lands (Penn, 1995). But it is not clear whether this is so
because the Agreement has not been fully or appropriately
implemented, or because the rights the Agreement gave the
Cree and Inuit to protect subsistence economies are subordi-
nate to the right to develop in the territory referred to in the
Agreement. As a result, it is difficult to ascertain the extent to
which the Agreement allows for critical consideration of
whether economic development is desirable in the territory
referred to in the Agreement.
CONCLUSION
At the signing of the James Bay and Northern Quebec
Agreement, Cree and Inuit expectations were that the
Agreement would give them the tools with which they
could exercise meaningful influence over development in
the territory referred to in the Agreement, in order to
protect their subsistence economies. The Agreement has
not met the expectations of the Native parties to the
Agreement. Some of the events and situations causing this
dissatisfaction result from the wording and contents of the
Agreement: it was written before there was much Cana-
dian experience with environmental assessment, and in
this sense it represents a pioneering document. This status
also means that the experience of other groups could not
inform the construction of the Agreement. Many sections
of the Agreement appear to be vague and difficult to
translate into workable principles. The advisory commit-
tee structure and process has not been well suited to Cree
and Inuit cultures. The right to develop is woven through
all sections on environmental protection. Finally, commit-
tee structures are exceedingly complex, involving federal
and provincial governments, with separate areas of juris-
diction, in addition to Native representatives. This com-
plexity is exacerbated in situations such as the Great
Whale Project, which overlaps Cree and Inuit territories.
When, in addition, governments have to be drawn into
participating through legal means, it may become difficult
to generate the consensus necessary to create less cumber-
some procedures (see Brooke, 1995).
However, it is also very clear that there are major issues
concerning implementation of the provisions of the Agree-
ment. This makes it very difficult to evaluate the effective-
ness of specific provisions. In this context, perhaps the
strongest lesson to be learned from the Agreement has to
do with the necessity of detailed plans for implementation.
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